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In recent years, cooperation between the United Nations (UN) and the European Union 
(EU) has grown exponentially. In this contribution I consider the motivations of the EU’s 
choice for the UN and the institutional complexities involved in the UN-EU relationship, 
both internally in the EU in order to obtain a better coordination among its 27 Member 
States, and externally, concerning the status of the EU within the UN system. After a brief 
overview of EU-UN cooperation in the areas of human development and security, I point 
to the uncertainties which both organizations face in their current reform processes, in 
particular the as of yet unresolved fate of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty, which contains 
provisions that could lead to a more unified EU representation in the UN. 
 
                                                 
1   The present contribution builds on J. Wouters, F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys (eds.), The United 
Nations and the European Union: An Ever Closer Partnership (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006). Jan Wouters 
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“There is no reason why a regional organisation of Europe 
should in any way conflict with the world organisation of 
the United Nations. On the contrary, I believe the larger 






For several years, high-ranking officials from the European Union have been saying that 
the EU and the UN are ‘natural partners’ in multilateralism.3 Numerous factors feed this 
opinion. Both organizations find their origins in the same desire to eliminate ‘the scourge 
of war’. A comparison of the principles and purposes moreover affirms the fundamental 
like-mindedness of the two institutions. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) explicitly 
refers to conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter4, whereas, under 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (hereafter ‘EU Constitution’), “respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter” constitutes one of the objectives of the 
Union’s external actions5 and the EU is committed to “promote multilateral solutions to 
common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations”6. Last but not 
least, the European Union has presented itself as a reliable and even a vital partner for 
the workings of the United Nations. The figures are telling: together the 27 EU Member 
States contribute more than 38 % of the UN’s regular budget (compared to some 22 % 
by the United States and some 20 % by Japan), more than two-fifths of the UN 
peacekeeping budget and around half of all UN Member States’ contributions to UN 
                                                 
2    Winston Churchill, “A ‘United States of Europe’”, 19 September 1946, Zürich University, 
Switzerland, from W.S. Churchill (ed.), Winston Churchill’s speeches. Never give in!, Pimlico, 
2003, 428. 
3    See e.g. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s notes on the UN World Summit 2005, press 
conference, 12 September 2005, available at http://www.europa-eu-un.org/ 
articles/en/article_5011_en.htm. All downloads as of 20 May 2007. 
4   Article 11(1), first and third indent, Treaty on European Union, Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on European Union, O.J. (24 December 2002) C-325/5. 
5   Article I-4(4) Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, O.J. (16 December 2004) C-310/1. 
See also Article I-41(1) and (7) as well as III-292(1), first para., and (2)(c) EU Constitution. 
Specifically as far as development cooperation is concerned, see Article III-316(2) EU 
Constitution; as far as humanitarian aid is concerned, see III-321(5) EU Constitution. 
6   Article III-292(1), second para., EU Constitution. EU Diplomacy Papers 4/2007 
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funds and programmes.7  The EU is also the largest provider of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), accounting for some 54 %.8 
 
Over the last years, EU-UN cooperation has gained new impetus as common ground 
between the two organizations has expanded – notably through the rapid 
development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) – to cover matters concerning not only trade and 
development, humanitarian aid and protection of the environment, but also the 
promotion of human rights, the fight against terrorism, conflict prevention, crisis 
management and peacebuilding. In this context, the EU has adopted a new credo of 
‘effective multilateralism’, firmly enshrined in the European Security Strategy of 
December 2003, which declares that “strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to 
fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority”.9  
 
The United Nations has generally responded positively to this rapprochement. Given the 
present workload of the world organization, it can well use an able and willing regional 
partner to alleviate its financial and logistical burdens, to provide political/diplomatic 
support for the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals or the 
environmental agenda, or to assist in crisis management (at present, some 100.000 blue 
helmets are deployed worldwide). This is also evident from the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document, in which heads of State suggested the expansion of consultation 
and cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional 
organizations through formalized agreements.10 
 
The strengthened emphasis from EU side on supporting the UN stems not just from a 
noble desire to further UN goals, but also – and probably more – from the ambition to 
establish the European Union as a ‘global actor’ in the international sphere. Both aims, 
                                                 
7   See “The enlarging European Union at the United Nations: making multilateralism matter”, 
January 2004, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/un/docs/ 
brochure0104.pdf, 6. 
8   Ibid., 4. 
9    “‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ - a European Security Strategy”, adopted by the 
European Council on 12 December 2003, available at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/ 
cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 
10   United Nations, “2005 World Summit Outcome”, UNGA Res. 60/1, 16 September 2005, para. 
170. Jan Wouters 
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however, require that EU Member States coordinate their actions so as to speak with 
one European voice, regardless of the entity or person that ultimately presents this 
position. Although in recent years considerable efforts have been made for closer intra-
EU and inter EU-UN coordination, one should not underestimate the many challenges to 
the EU’s presence and participation in the UN system. These are both internal to the EU 
and its Member States and external, relating to the UN and non-EU UN Member States.  
 
A Variety of Statuses within the UN and UN Family 
 
A first finding is the variety of EU statuses at various UN bodies. In 1964, the European 
Commission first established an information office in New York. Ten years later, this office 
was upgraded to the official European Community (EC) delegation to the United 
Nations following the granting of observer status to the European Community in the 
General Assembly. Presently, six such EC delegations exist: one in New York (accredited 
inter alia to the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, UNDP and 
UNICEF), one in Geneva (accredited to specialized bodies such as OCHCHR, UNHCR, 
ILO, WHO), one in Vienna (accredited to IAEA, UNODC), one in Paris (accredited to 
UNESCO), one in Rome (accredited to the FAO, WFP and IFAD), and one in Nairobi 
(accredited to UNEP and Habitat).11 Moreover, the EU Council has established Liaison 
Offices in New York and Geneva. These offices have no autonomous political function, 
but serve first and foremost to support the Member States, in particular the EU 
Presidency, in the day-to-day running of EU business at the United Nations. This includes 
the provision of information and the circulation of documents (through the electronic 
mailing network CIREU) as well as the facilitation of coordination among EU Member 
States. 
 
Further to this proliferation of EU delegations at the various UN seats, there is a trend of 
upgrading the formal status of the EU within certain UN bodies, ranging from a mere 
observer over an active participant to a full member. Next to the observer status of the 
European Community in the General Assembly since 1974, the Community became a 
member of the FAO in 1991. Since 2002, the Community has acted as a Member in the 
                                                 
11    Information on all these delegations is available at the website of EU@UN, see 
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/home/index_en.htm. EU Diplomacy Papers 4/2007 
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context of the World Food Summit, and in 2003, following lengthy negotiations, the 
Community became a Member of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, established 
under FAO auspices. Furthermore, throughout the entire UN system, remarkable 
developments have taken place as regards the granting of full participant (or 
enhanced observer) status to the Community. Such status was granted during many UN 
Conferences, for example the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (Rio, 1992) or the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannes-
burg, 2002). The Community also enjoys full participant status in the Commission for 
Sustainable Development since 1993, and last but not least, in the context of recent 
international negotiations under the auspices of the WHO (1999, 2003) and UNESCO 
(2005). With regard to UNHCR, an EC request for full participation is pending. 
 
Much Coordination, Yet Still Not Enough 
 
It is a commonplace that coordination between EU Member States at the UN is 
increasing. However, the mere frequency and the variety of the covered fields is 
astounding. For example, for the New York office alone it is estimated that around 1.300 
coordination meetings take place every year. These meetings cover all six main 
committees of the General Assembly and its subordinate bodies, as well as ECOSOC 
and its functional commissions. With regard to the activities of the Security Council, 
weekly Article 19-meetings (named after the coordination obligation laid down in 
Article 19 TEU) are organized. Even though the latter meetings cannot be said to 
constitute a genuine consultation process, they do supply EU Member States that are 
not members of the Security Council with valuable inside information on what was 
discussed in closed consultations of the Council and provide some insight into the 
Council’s future activities. Another 1.000 EU coordination meetings are organized each 
year in Geneva.  
 
Although policy formulation and positioning on UN decision-making is principally done in 
national capitals and Brussels-based EU institutions, these coordination meetings 
nevertheless play an important complementary and corrective role, allowing the EU to 
cope with the time difference between Brussels and New York as well as with the 
dynamism of activities ‘on the ground’. Jan Wouters 
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The coordination process has intensified over the years and has now become well-
entrenched in the practice of EU Member States. The net result has been twofold. On 
the one hand, there has been an increase in voting alignment, evidenced by the fact 
that EU cohesion now stands around 95 % of all resolutions adopted by the General 
Assembly, which is significantly higher than the general voting cohesion of circa 76 %. 
This means that EU Member States vote unanimously on four out of five General 
Assembly resolutions that are actually voted on. Split votes mainly concern dossiers that 
are politically (e.g. nuclear disarmament, decolonization or the Middle East) or ethically 
sensitive (e.g. human cloning). Although such split votes have become rather rare, they 
still tend to undermine the credibility of the EU as an international actor.  
 
On the other hand, the number of common EU and EC statements has grown 
considerably. Common positions mainly deal with peace and security matters, followed 
by economic and development issues, and are mostly presented by the EU Presidency. 
Common statements in the General Assembly are rarely delivered by the European 
Commission, even on areas for which it is directly responsible. This is partially due to the 
fact that the European Commission, because of its observer status, can only speak after 
all UN Member States. Thus, the Commission presents only some 5-7 statements a year to 
the Assembly, compared to the hundreds issued by the EU Presidency. This, however, 
does not withhold the Commission from playing an active role in informal Assembly 
sessions or in the drafting of common positions presented by the Presidency. 
 
The presentation of common statements is now a widespread practice, whether in 
open debates of the Security Council (in the form of EU Presidency statements with 
which the EU members of the Security Council will usually align), in General Assembly 
sessions or in the many UN conferences and summits. Often candidate countries which 
are expected to gradually align their foreign policy with the EU’s CFSP and other non-EU EU Diplomacy Papers 4/2007 
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countries with treaty links subscribe to the EU statement. This renders support to the voice 
of the EU Presidency to sometimes up to 37-38 States.12  
 
Both the upgrading of the EU status at various UN entities and the increase of EU 
coordination reflect the increased competences of the Community in a wide range of 
policy areas viz. the important evolution of the Union’s CFSP and ESDP and contribute to 
the visibility and influence of the European Union at the United Nations. Despite these 
positive trends, however, a lot of work remains to be done, both with regard to EU status 
and EU coordination. 
 
Firstly, the EC status remains unsatisfactory in a variety of UN bodies and agencies, such 
as the ILO or the Bretton Woods organizations, often undermining the efficient exercise 
of Community powers. Sometimes, the refusal to grant the EC adequate status is based 
o n  n o n - E U  c o u n t r i e s ’  f e a r  o f  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  E U  p o w e r ,  o r  t h e i r  u n f a m i l i a r i t y  w i t h  t h e  
division of competences between EU Member States and the European Commission. 
Thus, in the context of the r e c e n t  U N E S C O  C o n v e n t i o n  o n  C u l t u r a l  D i v e r s i t y ,  S t a t e s  
stressed the exceptional basis of the EC’s active participation in the negotiation 
process. On other occasions, poor EC status stems from political resistance from its own 
Member States to hand over important representational tasks to Brussels. Such an 
attitude is hard to reconcile with the duty of loyal cooperation enshrined in Article 10 EC 
Treaty, which may include an obligation for Member States to promote EC membership 
within international organizations.  
 
Furthermore, the coordination process still suffers from a number of shortfalls. Firstly, 
coordination is not always pursued with the same vigour. For the Security Council, for 
example, where the EU has no formal status, the Article 19-meetings are rather an 
exchange of information than a true discussion. Admittedly, the quality of these 
meetings has improved in recent years, turning from largely retrospective to more 
                                                 
12   Apart from the 27 EU Member States, up to eleven other States may align themselves with 
EU Presidency Statements. These are first and foremost the candidate countries Turkey, 
Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Other possible subscribers are 
the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates: 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. A third category consists of the EFTA 
countries Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. Last but not least, alignment is common for 
Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. Jan Wouters 
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prospective and more interactive briefings. Still, several improvements, such as the 
inclusion of representatives from the EU Presidency or the Council Secretariat in the 
delegations of EU Security Council Members, remain possible. Moreover, EU 
coordination in many UN specialized agencies remains very restricted. Only recently 
have ‘information rounds’ been introduced and then only for the New York-based 
agencies. With regard to the ILO, for instance, although EU Member States have been 
more and more recognizing the added value of timely upstream and on-the-spot 
coordination, EU coordination has not yet reached its full potential. Indeed, often EU 
Member States tend to give priority to preparatory discussion and statements in informal 
groups. In several other bodies, including the Bretton-Woods organizations, coordination 
remains very restricted or even absent, due to EU Member States’ prioritization of 
national positions. 
 
Apart from the aforementioned ‘gaps’ in the process, coordination also comes at a 
price. Obtaining consensus among 27 States requires an enormous amount of time and 
energy, taking up a large share of the workload of national representations of EU 
Member States. Moreover, this investment does not always guarantee a productive 
outcome. Indeed, often coordination only results in a least-common-denominator 
position, contributing little to the substantive debate at the UN and leaving individual EU 
Member States frustrated. The time and energy needed to reach agreement may also 
lead to rather rigid positions, difficult to adapt to the dynamism of the diplomatic 
process, and thus acting as a brake on negotiations. With regard to EU positions 
concerning human rights protection, these drawbacks could be remedied if the EU 
were to ‘pick its battles’ selectively, so as to make better use of its diversity and 
resources, instead of attempting a common position on every single issue. It may also be 
more effective to grant the EU Presidency greater flexibility to negotiate with third 
parties, instead of binding it to detailed EU statements.13   A l l  i n  a l l ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  E U  
coordination process has become a key feature of EU-UN relations, allowing the EU to 
speak with a more unified voice. 
 
                                                 
13   European Commission, Communication on “The European Union and the United Nations: 
the choice of multilateralism”, 10 September 2003, COM (2003)526. EU Diplomacy Papers 4/2007 
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The recognition of full participant status in several UN agencies and conferences, and 
the increase in EU coordination have allowed the EU to pragmatically improve its 
visibility and influence at the United Nations in spite of its inherent institutional 
complexities. In the longer term, however, these complexities, due to the variety of EU 
actors and the intransparency and ever-evolving nature of its division of competence, 
have to be addressed.  
 
Recent years have witnessed increased consultation between the UN and the EU to 
improve areas of actual cooperation. For example, EU representatives now meet the UN 
Secretary-General at ministerial level annually in New York. Moreover, the UN Deputy 
Secretary-General and other senior UN officials regularly visit EU institutions in Brussels, 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg. Other examples include meetings between senior UN 
officials and the EU Political and Security Committee or increased participation by 
Members of the European Parliament. Daily working contacts between the EU Council 
and Commission on the one hand and the UN Secretariat on the other hand have 
likewise developed considerably. Two areas have seen a particular rise of EU-UN 
cooperation and consultation: human development and security issues.  
 
UN-EU Cooperation on Human Development Issues 
 
In the field of human development, one cannot ignore the vital financial EC 
contribution to the workings of the UN, or the recent surge in EC funding to UN 
programmes and specialized agencies. As a member of FAO, the EC’s record on 
supporting worldwide programming and projects on food security, food safety and 
quality as well as rural development has led to a close relationship between the two 
organizations, a relationship that can be labelled a partnership rather than mere 
donorship. Moreover, the EU has frequently acted as a front-runner with regard to 
environmental protection, the protection and promotion of human rights, international 
labour standards or support for the International Criminal Court. In the context of the 
Commission on Sustainable Development, the EU has generally a positive and 
progressive image, allowing the EU to build bridges whose positions are far apart. 
Furthermore, the EU’s support for the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity and the 
WHO Tobacco Framework Convention was vital for their successful adoption.  Jan Wouters 
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On the other hand, some areas of cooperation show a mixed result. The EU’s role as a 
driving force behind many environmental treaties and as the main donor to UNEP, 
cannot hide the fact that European countries still figure among the world’s largest 
polluters. Furthermore, as regards asylum policy, the EC and EU Member States tend to 
keep UNHCR at arm’s length, making it hard for the latter body to monitor compliance 
with refugee instruments, without biting the hand that feeds it. It also remains unclear 
whether the EU’s concept of sustainable development copes with the one advocated 
by different UN bodies. Finally, the internal lack of financial discipline of EU Member 
States seems to hamper firm EU positions in the Bretton Woods institutions to revitalize the 
world economy.  
 
EU-UN cooperation in the broader field of development and humanitarian affairs is 
another topic that needs further research. The European Union has long been an 
important provider of Official Development Assistance. In 2004, for example, EU Member 
States and the European Commission together provided some € 35 billion in ODA, 
accounting for 54 % of worldwide development aid (compared to circa 20 % by the 
United States and 9 % by Japan). This figure is bound to rise in the future as EU donors 
have subscribed to the long-standing target of 0,7 % of GNP by 2015 and have set an 
interim target of 0,56 % of GNP to be implemented by 2010. Whether this target will be 
achieved remains to be seen; at present only five EU Member States have reached the 
said level of ODA (Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, the Netherlands and Portugal). If all 
EU donors would implement the target, this would imply an increase in EU ODA from the 
present € 35 billion to € 55 billion by 2010, a figure which is estimated to represent some 
63 % of ODA in that year.14  
 
A large share of the EU’s development aid and humanitarian assistance is borne by the 
European Community. In 2002, for example, the European Community provided € 6,5 
billion in ODA, or roughly one fifth of the total ODA of EU Member States, and € 538 
million for humanitarian assistance, or some 45 % of all EU humanitarian assistance (EC 
                                                 
14    See European Commission and OECD, EU Donor Atlas 2006: Volume I, February 2006, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/publications/docs/ 
eu_donor_atlas_2006.pdf#zoom=100, at 2. EU Diplomacy Papers 4/2007 
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aid included). 15  Of the latter amount, which is distributed through the European 
Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), almost a third is devoted to UN projects, 
especially those run by UNHCR. Similarly, of the development aid funded by the 
European Community (mainly distributed through EuropeAid), a considerable share 
flows to UN programmes, funds and specialized agencies, especially to the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the 
U N  R e l i e f  a n d  W o r k s  A g e n c y  f o r  P a l e s t i n e  R e f u g e e s  i n  t h e  N e a r  E a s t  ( U N R W A ) .  I t  i s  
remarkable how EC contributions to UN programmes and agencies have grown since 
2002. With regard to the WFP, for instance, EC contributions have gone from $ 179 million 
in 2002 to $ 264 million in 2005, thus firmly establishing the European Community as the 
second largest contributor (after the United States).16  EC contributions to UNDP have 
also increased from $ 226,5 million in 2004 to $ 427 million in 2005.17 Another illustration is 
the increase of funding to UNHCR from $ 71 million in 2002 to $ 86 million in 2005, making 
the European Community the third largest donor (after the United States and Japan).18 
 
Since the EC is a major contributor to UN funds and agencies, the European Commission 
has in past years attempted to use this financial leverage to improve coordination with 
the various UN agencies involved. In this regard, the European Commission in 2001 
issued a Communication in which it criticized the existing case-by-case cooperation 
between the EC and UN agencies, funds and programmes, and called for a more 
effective partnership with the United Nations in the fields of development and 
humanitarian affairs. 19   The Communication deplored the lack of a clear overall 
approach to cooperation, and of a general evaluation of that cooperation. The 
document also complained of difficulties in reaching agreement on principles for 
financial control and audit, as well as of inadequate reporting by UN entities. Last but 
not least, it criticized the lack of visibility of EC financing for UN operations. Indeed, if one 
looks at the pre-2005 Annual Reports of UNDP for example, the European Commission is 
                                                 
15   Loc. cit., supra n. 9, at 14, 33. 
16   Information on WFP funding is available at http://www.wfp.org/appeals/Wfp_donors. 
17    See UNDP Annual Reports of 2006 and 2005, available at http://www.undp.org 
/publications/annualreport2006/index.shtml. 
18    Data on UNHCR funding is available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/partners?id=3b963b874. 
19    Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
“Building an effective partnership with the United Nations in the fields of development and 
humanitarian affairs”, Brussels, 2 May 2001, COM(1002)231 final. Jan Wouters 
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not included in the ranking of top contributors. Instead, a footnote merely declares that 
the Commission “is a major source of non-core funding to UNDP”.20 In order to “improve 
the effectiveness of [the EC’s] development and humanitarian assistance as well as the 
quality of UN delivery”, the Communication contained a number of proposals, such as 
the identification of “strategic UN partners” or the improving of operational guidelines 
for cooperation with UN entities. 21  Several of these recommendations have been 
implemented in the meantime, leading to an intensification of UN-EC cooperation in 
development and humanitarian affairs.22 
 
An important step was taken on 29 April 2003, when UN Deputy Secretary-General 
Fréchette and European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Nielson 
signed the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement between the EC and 
the UN (FAFA).23  This agreement addresses procedures and conditions regarding EC 
funding to the United Nations. It focuses on a results-oriented approach, based on 
objective indicators of achievement and provides for the participation of Commission 
representatives in the main monitoring and evaluation missions relating to the 
performance of EC-funded actions. The agreement regulates UN reporting 
requirements, deals with the issue of EC visibility and stresses that UN procedures should 
conform to internationally accepted standards. The FAFA applies to all contribution-
specific agreements with the UN secretariat and UN funds and programmes (e.g. 
UNICEF, UNDP). Moreover, as foreseen in the FAFA, numerous UN specialized agencies 
(ILO, FAO, UNIDO, WHO, WMO, UNESCO, IAEA, IFAD and ICAO) have acceded to the 
Agreement through an exchange of letters. As a result, a single set of rules now applies 
to a whole array of EC-UN projects, thus facilitating cooperation and disbursement. In 
accordance with the Agreement, a Working Group was established to oversee 
                                                 
20   Ibid. 
21   Ibid. 
22   In February 2007, the UN published a brochure The Partnership between the UN and the EU, 
which details the cooperation between the UN and the European Commission in 
development and humanitarian cooperation. It is both available on the UN and European 
Commission websites: see http://www.unric.org/html/english/pdf/UN-EC%20Report.pdf and 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/reports/un_ec_report_final_march_2007_en.pdf. 
23   “Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement between the European Community 
and the United Nations”, 29 April 2003, at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/ 
tender/gestion/cont_typ/onu/un_ec_fwc_en.pdf. EU Diplomacy Papers 4/2007 
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implementation and agreement through yearly meetings. These meetings have allowed 
to clarify and supplement the FAFA rules.  
 
Another novelty is the conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) establishing 
Strategic Partnerships between the EC and selected UN partners. An example hereof is 
the MOU concluded on 28 June 2004 between the EC and UNDP.24 This (legally non-
binding) document sets out possible areas of cooperation, which may be used for 
elaborating a commonly agreed multi-annual work programme. It also provides for 
regular policy dialogue, inter alia through regular high-level bilateral meetings or yearly 
senior level meetings. Furthermore, the two parties agreed on a number of working 
principles, for example with regard to exchange of information or informal consultation 
on a desk-to-desk basis and between representatives at the field level. Similar 
partnerships were set up with WHO, FAO, ILO and UNCHR, leading to an intensification 
of cooperation and consultation, both on the strategic and operational levels.  
 
The conclusion of the FAFA and the creation of strategic partnerships have fuelled a 
closer, more uniform and more efficient cooperation between the EC and the UN with 
regard to development and humanitarian assistance. Both developments have 
moreover strengthened the EC’s influence and visibility. However, they do not remedy 
the weak status of the Community in most UN agencies or the low-key EU coordination 
on development and humanitarian issues.  
 
UN-EU Cooperation on Security Issues 
 
C r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  a r g u a b l y  t h e  a r e a  w h e r e  U N - E U  r e l a t i o n s  h a v e  m a d e  m o s t  
progress in recent years: it has transcended mere statements like the September 2003 
Joint Declaration on UN-EU cooperation in crisis management, covering both civilian 
and military operations25, and practical cooperation on the basis of an institutionalized 
                                                 
24   “Memorandum of Understanding concerning the establishment of a strategic partnership 
between the European Commission and the United Nations Development Programme”, 28 
June 2004, available at http://europeandcis.undp.org/WaterWiki/images/8/88/ 
MoU_EC_UNDP.pdf. 
25   “Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management”, New York, 24 September 
2003, available at http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/lt/article_2768_lt.htm. Jan Wouters 
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but unbureaucratic framework has become routine business by now. The beginning of 
this important development can be traced back to the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which 
incorporated the so-called Petersberg Tasks in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (Article 17(2) TEU). These tasks concern humanitarian tasks, peace-keeping tasks, 
and tasks for combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. In 
subsequent years, EU Member States engaged in an ambitious capability-building 
programme on the basis of consecutive Headline Goals. This led to the creation of a 
60.000-strong Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), consisting of pools of national units and of a 
number of smaller rapidly deployable battlegroups. Likewise, on the civilian crisis 
management side, EU Member States contributed to a reserve pool of police officers, 
judges, prison officers, etc. Since 2003, as the initial capability targets were achieved, 
the EU has engaged in a growing number of military and police operations, both in the 
European region (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia) and elsewhere (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo, Aceh). These 
operations have gradually established the EU’s reputation as a security provider and 
peacebuilder. Moreover, CFSP crisis operations have rendered important support to UN 
peacekeeping activities. EU-led operations bear some of the UN’s logistical and 
financial burden – currently stretched to its limits as a result of the deployment of some 
75.000 troops in 15 different peacekeeping operations –, especially in areas where UN 
peacekeeping is traditionally weaker (e.g. rapid deployment). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
for example, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) took over from the International Police Task 
Force, thus allowing the UN to redeploy elsewhere. In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the EU sent troops to Bunya when violence in the region escalated, thus 
allowing the UN operation in the DRC (MONUC) the necessary time to beef up its 
presence. Most recently, the European Union sent troops to the DRC (EUFOR RD Congo) 
to support MONUC in its functions during the election process. Finally, as regards peace 
building, the EU’s contribution to the civil UN Interim Mission in Kosovo since 1999 may 
serve as an example of a joint nation-building process, where institutional and personal 
intertwining between the two organizations reached an unprecedented peak. This 
mission serves as an illustration both of the potential benefits of UN-EU cooperation and 
the challenges thereof, allowing important lessons to be drawn for future cooperation 
on the ground. 
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These examples illustrate the important contribution that EU crisis management can 
make to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It can assist UN peacekeeping in 
important ways, while strengthening EU visibility as a global actor. It can also set a 
precedent for closer relations between the UN and other regional, sub-regional or 
‘quasi-regional’ organizations, such as the African Union or ECOWAS, especially in light 
of the World Summit Outcome’s call for more formalized cooperation with partner 
organizations. 26  On the other hand, some caution is needed when assessing this 
evolution. Firstly, it should be emphasized that most EU-led operations have been of 
modest size and that EU capabilities are still rather limited (the latter is a fortiori true for 
the African Union and ECOWAS). Furthermore, the creation of numerous EU-led 
operations should not divert attention from the fact that EU personnel contributions to 
UN-led peacekeeping operations are extremely low. Indeed, although EU Member 
States account for two fifths of UN peacekeeping funding, at present only one out of 
fifteen blue helmets comes from an EU country. In this regard, EU Member States should 
carefully consider the UN Secretariat’s plea for participation of EU battlegroups in a UN 
‘Strategic Reserve’ and for cooperation in the establishment of a UN Standing Police 
Force.27 On a broader level, the growing role of regional, sub-regional organizations and 
the like (e.g. the EU, NATO, AU) in crisis management raises the fundamental question as 
to where the appropriate division of tasks between the latter organizations and the UN 
lies. In this regard, there is a growing need for constitutional clarity, which will have to be 
addressed in the years to come. 
 
Another important milestone for EU-UN cooperation on security issues was the adoption 
of the European Security Strategy in December 2003 with its emphasis on comprehen-
sive security. By putting the strengthening of the international rule of law and the UN at 
the centre of EU foreign policy objectives and seeing the UN as “the fundamental 
framework for international relations”, it reassured the UN in a rough post-9-11 climate.28 
 
                                                 
26   United Nations, “2005 World Summit Outcome”, op.cit., para. 170. 
27    See UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations J.-M. Guéhenno in M. 
Ortega (ed.), The European Union and the United Nations: Partners in Effective 
Multilateralism, EU-ISS Chaillot Paper No. 78, June 2005, available at http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai78.pdf, 7-12.  
28   “‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ - a European Security Strategy”, op.cit. (emphasis 
added). Jan Wouters 
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Furthermore, as the European Security Strategy identified the threats arising out of 
terrorism as one of the key challenges for the international system, the European Union 
put its means at the disposal of the UN to implement relevant Security Council 
resolutions. In this regard, the European weight is also important in shaping further 
normative UN standards and in fine-tuning UN targeted sanctions against individuals. It 
may also well be the case that European Courts will be among the first to balance the 
need to comply with UN Security Council resolutions with fundamental human rights, 
including the right to judicial review and a fair trial.29  
 
Crisis, Reform and EU Enlargement 
 
A final, more contextual finding concerns the fact that both the EU and the UN are 
currently experiencing rather critical moments in their respective histories, a fact which 
should be kept in mind when examining UN-EU relations. On the UN side, the loss of 
credibility of a number of organs such as the (now-abolished) Commission on Human 
Rights, sexual abuse by blue helmets, mismanagement evidenced most amply as a 
result of the oil-for-food scandal, the divisions created by the Iraq war in 2003 and 
profound dissatisfaction with the lack of representativeness and transparency of the 
Security Council have fuelled a call for fundamental reform of the world organization. 
The European Union, on the other hand, is struggling to cope with the arrival of twelve 
new Member States. Whereas the EU has thus ‘widened’ considerably and is set to 
further enlarge in upcoming years, the ‘deepening’ of EU integration has grinded to a 
painful and unpromising halt as a result of the negative outcome of referenda on the EU 
Constitution in France and the Netherlands in June 2005. For the time being, the EU is still 
considering a way out of this constitutional crisis, which may be by means of a more 
concise treaty that incorporates most of the institutional changes brought about by the 
EU Constitution. 
 
                                                 
29   See notably Court of First Instance, judgments of 21 September 2005 in Cases T-306/01 Yusuf 
and Al-Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission and T-315/01 Kadi v. 
Council and Commission, not yet published in the ECR ; judgments of 12 July 2006 in Cases 
T-253/02 Ayadi v ; Council and T49/04 Hassan v. Council and Commission, not yet published 
in the ECR. EU Diplomacy Papers 4/2007 
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Some progress has been made on UN reform as a result of the World Summit in 
September 2005 and subsequent implementation of its recommendations. With 
significant input from the EU a Peacebuilding Commission was created30, and a Human 
Rights Council replaced the discredited Commission on Human Rights.31 However, UN 
reform is far from complete. Thus, whereas the two new bodies were almost universally 
welcomed, both have very high expectations to live up to. If anything, the 
disappointing first sessions of the Human Rights Council illustrate the challenges for EU 
coordination and the need for vigilance with regard to the operation and output of this 
new organ. Secondly, implementation of several other aspects of the World Summit 
Outcome has given rise to considerable disagreement mainly between western and 
developing States. This was most evident in the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee, 
dealing with budgetary and administrative matters, where a six-month spending cap 
was imposed on the UN budget in order to increase pressure for management reform, 
the latter being opposed by developing States. Only at the very last minute was the 
spending cap lifted, thus averting a major financial crisis at the United Nations. 
Furthermore, several controversial issues (e.g. nuclear proliferation, a definition of 
terrorism) were not addressed in the World Summit Outcome. The most remarkable 
lacuna in the Outcome Document is the lack of proposals on Security Council reform. 
This matter has for decades given rise to fierce debates among UN Member States and 
continues to hang over the United Nations like the sword of Damocles. It is also a highly 
divisive issue for the European Union (mainly because Italy opposes a permanent seat 
for Germany), hindering a comprehensive unified EU position on UN reform. 
 
On the EU side, the enlargement to 27 Member States has arguably strengthened the 
EU’s influence and voting power, without substantially undermining EU coordination at 
the United Nations. Indeed, coordination meetings have continued as usual. Moreover, 
voting cohesion remains high, given the fact that the ten newcomers already aligned 
with EU voting in the vast majority of cases in the years preceding their actual 
                                                 
30   Established by UNGA Res. 60/180 and  SC Res. 1645 (2005), 20 December 2005. As to the 
EU’s position in the Peacebuilding Commission, see F. Hoffmeister, “Outsider or Frontrunner? 
Recent Developments under International and European Law on the Status of the 
European Union in International Organizations and Treaty Bodies”, Common Market Law 
Review (2007), 41, at 53. 
31   Established by UNGA Res. 60/251, adopted on 15 March 2006. Jan Wouters 
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accession. Still, enlargement implies that coordination becomes more time-consuming 
and inevitably increases the potential for split votes on politically or ethically sensitive 
dossiers. Furthermore, the negative referenda on the EU Constitution have dramatically 
exposed the uncertainty on the future course of European integration. This also affects 
UN-EU relations in several ways. For instance, the EU Constitution contains several 
provisions on the appointment of an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and the establishment 
of a European External Action Service.32 In cases where the EU has defined a position on 
an item which is on the agenda of the Security Council, the EU Constitution states that 
“those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs be asked to present the Union’s position”.33 Article III-196(1) 
moreover declares that the EU Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall, by 
qualified majority, adopt common positions within the competent international financial 
institutions and conferences on matters of particular interest for the economic and 
monetary union. The Council may also, again by qualified majority vote, adopt 
‘appropriate measures to ensure unified representation’ within these institutions (Article 
III-196(2)). These measures could assist the EU in speaking with a unified voice and would 
certainly further EU visibility at the United Nations. Moreover, the EU Constitution explicitly 
endows the EU with legal personality.34 Such a development would obviously have far-
reaching consequences for EU participation in the UN’s principal organs, funds, 
programmes and specialized agencies. This again illustrates that underlying linkages 
exist between the two dossiers of UN reform and EU reform and enlargement; linkages 
that have repercussions for UN-EU relations. This being said, the EU Constitution should 
not be seen as a panacea for the EU’s position and role in the UN. The introduction of a 
‘double-hatted’ EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, sitting in the Commission as well as in the 
Council, carries a number of complexities and uncertainties with it,35 and the decision-
making procedures for CFSP matters remain largely based on unanimity. One should not 
forget either that, even if the institutional mechanisms at the EU side become better 
                                                 
32   E.g. Articles I-28 and III-296(1) and (2) (EU Minister for Foreign Affairs), Article III-296(3) (the 
European External Action Service) EU Constitution. 
33   Article III-305 EU Constitution. 
34   Article I-7 EU Constitution. 
35    See J. Wouters, “The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs: Europe’s Single Voice or Trojan 
Horse?”, in J.W. de Zwaan, J.H. Jans and F.A. Nelissen (eds.), The European Union. An 
Ongoing Process of Integration. Liber Amicorum Alfred E. Kellermann (T.M.C. Asser Press, 
2004), 77-86. EU Diplomacy Papers 4/2007 
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attuned to an efficient coordination and representation in the UN and UN family of 
organizations, the EU’s position and role in the latter will remain subject to constraints 
proper to the work of intergovernmental bodies and organizations, including the need 
for acceptance of an enhanced EU position by the other Member States of these 




In recent years, the EU has affirmed its wish to become a world actor through a 
multilateral policy, which puts the United Nations at its very heart. But does the 
European Union also live up to its commitments in its actual practice? This question can 
be seen from two angles of incidence: firstly, to what extent does the growing EU-UN 
partnership further the aims and activities of the United Nations, and secondly, to what 
e x t e n t  d o e s  t h e  E U  m a n a g e  t o  s p e a k  w i th one voice and influence UN decision-
making? 
 
The former question is fairly easy to answer. True, in some areas the EU still suffers from a 
lack of credibility. Thus, despite the surge in Official Development Assistance, EU 
Member States still dump massive amounts of subsidized agricultural products on the 
world market, to the detriment of developing countries’ national economies. Likewise, 
continuous lip service to the UN Charter cannot hide the fact that some EU Member 
States participated in recent military campaigns against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and Iraq without authorization from the UN Security Council. However, when 
looking at the whole picture of EU-UN cooperation in areas such as environmental 
protection, human rights promotion, counterterrorism etc., the EU’s support for the 
principles and purposes of the UN outweighs the more questionable effects of some of 
its policies and of the military actions of some of its Member States.36 It is therefore safe 
to assert that the EU and the UN are, indeed, true partners in multilateralism. 
 
The second question is harder to tackle. On the one hand, the EU constitutes a Union of 
27 States, covering 492 million people, producing a quarter of the world’s GNP. On the 
                                                 
36   B. Fassbender, “The better peoples of the United Nations? Europe’s practice and the United 
Nations”, European Journal of International Law (2004), 857, at 883. Jan Wouters 
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other hand, it is generally acknowledged that the EU’s influence on the world stage falls 
short of its economic and political weight. This is probably true as regards international 
security issues, where the EU is only just establishing itself as a ‘global actor’. However, in 
other areas, the EU has achieved significant successes (e.g. the entry into force of the 
Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court or the Kyoto Protocol) and is generally 
perceived as a key player. This holds first and foremost for the economic sphere, but 
also in the environmental and aid-related arenas.37  
 
The key to EU influence on UN decision-making lies in speaking with a single voice –even 
though it is probably overoptimistic to believe that “if the EU is united, they cannot be 
defeated”.38 In this regard, it should be welcomed that EU coordination in UN fora has 
increased significantly over the past years. The UN reform process serves as a good 
example hereof where EU Member States facilitated through close intra-EU coordination 
the establishment of the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission. 
 
EU influence and visibility would further increase if the coordination process, which is 
now firmly entrenched at the UN’s main bodies, would spread consistently to the 
activities of all of the UN’s funds, programmes and specialized agencies. In this regard, 
there certainly remains room for improvement. EU Member States must also do better in 
‘selling’ the EU and the EC to non-members. This means first and foremost that the EU 
must abide by its own rules on who is to represent the EU/EC in different circumstances 
and that EU Member Status must promote EU accession to international organizations 
where appropriate. In the longer term, the EU must provide an answer to Kissinger’s 
question as to ‘who to call when I want to speak with Europe?’. The EU must work for a 
more transparent division of competences and a clearer external representation. The EU 
Constitution does offer a step in the right direction. It remains to be seen whether some 
of the Constitution’s novelties cannot be realized through formal inter-institutional 
agreements, informal codes of conduct or constant practice. 
 
                                                 
37   See e.g. N. Chaban, O. Elgström and M. Holland, “The European Union as others see it”, 
European Foreign Affairs Review (2006), 245, at 262. 
38    See K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith, “Introduction – The European Union at the United 
Nations: leader, partner or failure?”, in K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith, op. cit., 16. EU Diplomacy Papers 4/2007 
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In the end, it would be wrong to explain the limits and shortcomings of current EU-UN 
relations solely in the light of the aforementioned crises and lack of institutional reforms. 
At least as important, it is submitted, is the lack of political will, leadership and vision of 
the EU’s current leaders. Thus, the lack of an EU position on such a central issue of the 
UN’s architecture as Security Council reform painfully shows the severe limits of the EU’s 
role in the UN. Much more political courage and vision will be needed to strengthen the 
role of the EU in the UN system and fill the ‘leadership gap’ that currently enfeebles and 
undermines the UN and the accomplishment of its objectives. 
 Jan Wouters 
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